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Background: Laboratory capacity building is characterized by a paradox between
endemicity and resources: countries with high endemicity of pathogenic agents often
have low and intermittent resources (water, electricity) and capacities (laboratories, trained
staff, adequate regulations). Meanwhile, countries with low endemicity of pathogenic
agents often have high-containment facilities with costly infrastructure and maintenance
governed by regulations. The common practice of exporting high biocontainment facilities
and standards is not sustainable and concerns about biosafety and biosecurity require
careful consideration.
Methods: A group at Chatham House developed a draft conceptual framework for safer,
more secure, and sustainable laboratory capacity building.
Results: The draft generic framework is guided by the phrase “LOCAL – PEOPLE –
MAKE SENSE” that represents three major principles: capacity building according to local
needs (local) with an emphasis on relationship and trust building (people) and continuous
outcome and impact measurement (make sense).
Conclusion: This draft generic framework can serve as a blueprint for international policy
decision-making on improving biosafety and biosecurity in laboratory capacity building,
but requires more testing and detailing development.
Keywords: biosafety, biosecurity, laboratory capacity building, biorisk, international health regulations, emerging
infectious diseases
INTRODUCTION
International prevention and control of infectious diseases requires a variety of health (human and
animal) system capacities, including laboratory capacity for surveillance and diagnostics worldwide
(1–3). This capacity building is recognized and enforced by the revised International Health
Regulations (IHR 2005) of the World Health Organization (WHO) (4–6). Building laboratory
capacity worldwide is, however, an activity with intrinsic complexities and paradoxes: countries with
high endemicity of disease often have low resources (water, electricity) and capacities (laboratories,
trained staff, adequate regulations) to survey and diagnose the diseases caused by these agents,
whereas countries with low endemicity of high pathogenic agents often have high-containment
facilities with costly infrastructure and maintenance.
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With increasing laboratory capacity worldwide the global
health security agenda considers biosafety and biosecurity top-
ics as relevant (7–9). In the international convention, Biosafety
refers to “principles, technologies, practices, and measures imple-
mented to prevent the accidental release of, or unintentional
exposure to pathogenic agents” (10). Biosecurity refers to the
“protection, control, and accountability measures implemented to
prevent the loss, theft, misuse, diversion, or intentional release of
pathogenic agents and related resources as well as unauthorized
access to, retention or transfer of such material” (10). It is neces-
sary to get the balance of concerns over proliferation and the need
to diagnosis and undertake surveillance.
Biomaterials have to be handled safely and securely in all
settings: work on harmful and infectious biological materials
inside laboratories needs to be contained and separated from
a not-contaminated environment (biocontainment). To ensure
the safety of laboratory personnel and the environment, work
on pathogens in high-resource laboratory settings is classified in
biosafety levels 1–4 (BSL1–4) (11). This classification draws on
the concept of step-wise biocontainment that aims at keeping
the pathogen confined to a designated space. Biocontainment,
however, allows for a relative risk based, differential approach by
focusing on the difference – the barrier – between a pathogenic
interior and a less pathogenic exterior. The physical containment
of pathogens protects the workers or the unintended release of
pathogens that could lead to laboratories being the source of
outbreaks. In high-resource settings, regulations for safe oper-
ations in animal and human health laboratories exist (12–16).
However, despite its containment standards laboratory accidents
(17), unintentional exposure (18–20), and unintentional release
(21, 22) occur andmaintenance of these containment standard are
strongly recommended (23, 24).
Additionally, security concerns exist about the proliferation of
high-containment laboratories and the illegal acquisition or inten-
tional release of high consequence pathogenic agents. Systems
designed to prevent themisuse of potentially hazardous biological
material are generally described as biosecurity systems. Despite
its importance, biosecurity concepts and approaches, however, are
less well understood, not always adequately reflected, connected,
and implemented with biosafety systems (25, 26). Recently, a
framework to help evaluate biosafety and biosecurity incidents
provides a useful rationale (27). This framework uses a seven
category scale to assess incidents and situation in this regards
to their impacts on personnel, integrity of containment, and
the environment (27). Using this metric and rating system for
risk assessment could improve the common understanding of
biosafety and biosecurity risks and facilitate risk communication.
To ensure the safe and secure handling of pathogenic agents
the current practice is mainly focused on exporting the complex
costly containment, “western standard” of laboratory safety into
vulnerable areas of the world with high demand for laboratory
activity due to emergency outbreak situations or a continuous
high prevalence. This practice has not always been effective, to
date, needed investments have not been fully sustainable, the
“western standard” of biosafety relies on adequate and continuous
access to resources and educated personnel (28–30). Biosecurity
concepts and approaches have been very slow to be addressed this
at the same rate as the development of biosafety systems (31).
The Global Health Security Agenda points to a lack of collabo-
ration and integration of health and security approaches and com-
munities and thus calls to end the silo-thinking and encourages
an integrated health security approach (5, 32–34). There is a need
for new and innovative approaches to building laboratory capacity
worldwide, and in particular in low-resource settings, and ensure
safe and secure handling of biomaterials.
Safe and Secure Biomaterial Project
To this end, a ChathamHouse project on “Safe and Secure Bioma-
terials,” funded by the UK International Biosecurity Programme,
aimed to explore and analyze the practice and regulations of
biosafety and biosecurity in low- and high-resource settings and
develop a generic framework that could guide international policy
decision-making to build laboratory capacity with a focus on
low-resource settings.
This project had two phases. In phase 1 (2012) of this research
project, stakeholders were convened to discuss the research prob-
lem, the project plan of international laboratory capacity building
and to provide an overview of the landscape of biosafety and biose-
curity regulations and guidelines. In a Chatham House research
paper, the outcomes of the first phase describes the need for
laboratory capacity building, the discrepancy between endemicity
and resources, different standards of biosafety and biosecurity reg-
ulations in G7 and seven low- and middle-income countries and
the isolated approaches of the health and security communities
(35, 36). The research paper suggests a relative risk approach to
rethink current regulations and practices for further exploration
in the next phase of the project (37, 38).
Phase 2 of the project (2014) used the conceptual framing of
the relative risk approach to discuss and develop a generic frame-
work for a safer, more secure, and sustainable laboratory capacity
building. In a scoping meeting with international stakeholders,
the approach and initial framework ideas were discussed and
tested to prepare for a broader workshop. This scoping meet-
ing was attended by 17 senior experts from low-, middle-, and
high-income countries, international organizations, and research
institutions.
The bigger workshop offered a forum for intense collabo-
ration and interaction of different stakeholders from low- and
high-resource settings; the bigger workshop was attended by
23 senior experts from biomedical sciences, engineering, and
policy-making from both fields of biosafety and biosecurity in
low-, middle-, and high-income countries. In this bottom-up
approach, the main pillars of the generic framework were created.
This workshop also serves to agree on recommendations and pro-
mote this framework for adoption into the international discourse
of biosafety and biosecurity.
This article describes the generic framework, discusses the
potential implication of this approach and summarizes the rec-
ommendations for a safer, more secure, and sustainable laboratory
capacity building.
METHODS
Key and diverse stakeholders from differing disciplines and
backgrounds reflected and determined a generic framework
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for assessing best solutions for laboratory capacity building
(smaller scoping meeting; larger workshop). This was done in
a two-step process: in a smaller scoping meeting, stakehold-
ers were consulted to generate feedback on initial ideas to
challenge conventional thinking and receive consensus regard-
ing the relative-risk approach that would serve as a narra-
tive to develop a generic framework in a broader workshop
scenario.
In a second step, the workshop applied a creative, interac-
tive approach to jointly reflect and elaborate on safer, more
secure, and sustainable solutions for laboratory capacity building.
The 2-day workshop was based on interactive, interdisciplinary
work in small groups of people coming from different pro-
fessional backgrounds (biomedical, sciences, engineering, and
policy-making) with experience from both fields of biosafety
and biosecurity in low-, middle-, and high-resource settings1.
The workshop applied a focus group approach and empha-
sized group work that was structured to trigger dialog and
debate on current practices, stimulate thinking about what
changes could lead to safer, more secure, and sustainable
laboratory capacity building (particularly in low-income coun-
tries), and capture participant insights on the specific compo-
nents, attributes, and principles of such changes. People from
a diverse background and experience used analytical tools and
templates to analyze the contradictions, contrasts, and issues
and presented their results in plenary sessions for broader
discussion.
RESULTS
Relative-Risk Approach
The relative-risk approach to safe and secure laboratory capacity
building moves away from the use of predetermined standards
under which work on particular pathogens should be performed.
Such standards were felt to represent aWestern and high-resource
setting perspective that is far from realities in different parts
of the world and neither achievable nor sustainable in low-
resource settings. The relative-risk approach focuses on condi-
tions of biosafety and biosecurity that can make work safer,
more secure, and sustainable in specific environments. To this
end, the approach builds on a contextual assessment of risks
and considers the system and environments (e.g., information,
communication, and coordination systems) in which labora-
tory capacity is being built. This differential approach reflects
and relates “inside” of the laboratory with “outside” the lab-
oratory and considers the permeability of the barrier separat-
ing them. This approach focuses on the barrier that separates
the inside from the outside and provides a structured assess-
ment of the relative risks. Rather than defining the endpoint as
adherence to Western standards, it focuses on agreed outcomes
(e.g., maintaining the biocontainment barrier) and develops
contextually appropriate, relevant parameters for biosafety and
biosecurity.
1Participants from low-, mid-, and high-income countries were chosen based on
their experience in biosafety and biosecurity. The workshop was held under the
Chatham House Rule; thus, we are not permitted to disclose names.
Tools and templates used during the workshop incorpo-
rated this structure to help participants elicits the contextual
parameters. The matrix templates were designed to reflect three
dimensions:
 Inside: people
 Barrier: integrity of containment systems
 Outside: environment, e.g., structures and services
For each dimension (i.e., people, integrity of containment,
structures, and services), groups identified key influencing factors
and described how these could support innovative and sustainable
solutions for a safer and more secure handling of biomaterials. To
enable this discussion, the matrix required participants to reflect
on an ideal situation and compare this to realities in high-resource
and low-resource settings.
Biosafety–Biosecurity
Biosafety and biosecurity requirements and concerns are often
addressed separately and from different stakeholders’ perspec-
tives. However, in this workshop, participants articulated a shift
in the conventional understanding of biosafety and biosecurity:
rather than assuming biosafety and biosecurity as different and
discrete entities, participants stressed that biosafety and biosecu-
rity aspects are often intertwined and interlinking. Participants
agreed that the many aspects and activities of biosafety and biose-
curity could be and should be woven together as a tapestry with
multiple layers and components, and concluded that the two areas
of concern overlap. For instance, safe operations in laborato-
ries require trust between staff members, training, and reliable
systems. The same aspects are relevant for biosecurity. Instead
of stressing the differences, participants reinforced the approach
to integrate biosafety and biosecurity in one interdisciplinary
discourse.
Objectives of a Generic Framework: SAFER
The main objectives for a generic framework for safer, more
secure, and sustainable laboratory capacity building was captured
by the SAFER acronym. SAFER stands for
 Sustainable: laboratory capacity can be maintained indepen-
dently over a long-term period;
 Affordable: communities do not depend on external aid for core
functionality;
 Functional: the laboratory staff are safer than currently, com-
munities are at less risk of the laboratory being the source of
the infection and the presence of the surveillance anddiagnostic
capability keeps the community safer;
 Effective: laboratory capacity building presents the most suit-
able application for the specific environment; and
 Realistic: laboratory capacity building is an answer to a question
that the community actually has.
Generic Framework:
Local – People – Make Sense
The generic framework for sustainable, safer, and more secure
laboratory capacity has three principles that are summarized in
the phrase “LOCAL – PEOPLE – MAKE SENSE.”
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The first key principle is the LOCAL principle. This includes
 Involving local people at every stage of capacity building;
 Building on existing infrastructure (assets and needs, on-going
developmental plans and activities); and
 Meeting local requirements.
 Sustained locally
The second principle in laboratory capacity building is the
PEOPLE principle. It is important to:
 Build relationships;
 Develop trust;
 Develop relevant skills (e.g., laboratory, construction, testing,
etc.);
 Engage in two-way communication: gather intelligence insights
on perceptions, culture, attitudes, and behaviors that then
inform communication and compliance;
 Create networks; and
 Advocate for political buy-in.
The third principle reflects the need to monitor, measure, and
evaluate the process of improving biosafety and biosecurity in
support of necessary laboratory procedures. Making sense is an
active process that includes
 Developing metrics to use in measurement and evaluation;
 Identifying relevance of settings and needs;
 Measuring starting points and progress;
 Evaluating effectiveness of the biosafety and biosecurity solu-
tion and networks of supporting structures of laboratory capa-
bility; and
 Learning and informing developmental planning.
Capacity Building Action Areas: 4M
The key biosafety and biosecurity capacity building areas are
summarized in the mnemonic 4M. These are
 HUMAN: referring to training, education, and communication
activities;
 METHODS: referring to developing standard operating proce-
dures and guidelines;
 MATERIAL: referring to designing appropriate buildings
(engineering and architecture), and security; and
 MONEY: referring to advocating for resource allocations and
developing a range of funding models.
Framework to Guide Decision-Making
The framework is a matrix that applies the three key principles
(left column) as a y-axis to the four capacity building areas (4M)
on an x-axis (Table 1).
The three key principles (Local – People – Make sense) should
be applied to each of the capacity building areas. When consid-
ering capacity building, e.g., in the field of “HUMANS,” training,
education, and communication activities have tomatch the “Local
People Make sense” criteria. Training has to include local people,
building on existing infrastructures, and meet local requirements.
TABLE 1 | Local people make sense – key criteria for safer, more secure,
and sustainable capacity building .
HUMANS METHODS MATERIAL MONEY
LOCAL
PEOPLE
MAKE SENSE
Training objectives need to include relationship building, trust
development among relevant skill building, etc. Training efforts
should be monitored andmeasured against the SAFER objectives;
this requires the development of an appropriate metric in context
sensitive and variable environment, etc.
For capacity building in fields ofmethods,material, andmoney,
the same procedure is envisioned: capacity building activities in
the fields of methods, material, and money need to comply the
Local – People – Make Sense principle.
The fields of capacity building activities (Humans, Methods,
Materials, Money), as a x-axis, and the Local – People – Make
Sense-principle, as a y-axis, presents the guiding frame for the
concept and design of activities, the empty fields in thematrix give
room to develop solutions in different contexts that make sense in
diverse and changing environments.
DISCUSSION
Generic Application for Local Solutions
This framework for sustainable, safer, and more secure laboratory
capacity is generic and aims to guide decision-making. It does
not provide answers, but helps to develop local, context-sensitive
solutions. The application of this framework is seen as an iterative
process. When facing decisions on if and how to improve labora-
tory capacity, the framework can help decision makers, scientists,
architects, and other stakeholders to agree on and achieve SAFER
outcomes.
Framework for Planning, Monitoring and
Evaluation
This matrix serves as a the core part of the conceptual frame-
work that helps guide the (i) planning, (ii) monitoring, and (iii)
evaluation of alternative approaches to laboratory capacity build-
ing worldwide. Although this framework is still in the drafting
phase, participants felt that it indicates the right approach and
provides planners, public and veterinary health scientists, policy-
makers, engineers, architects, and other professionals with a
useful tool.
Global Initiatives with Local Solutions
Training and capacity building are well-established initiatives on
the international agenda in development, science, and science.
However, in contrast to many capacity building activities, this
framework calls for a different approach: rather than implementa-
tion “western” goal and training programs it calls for sustainable
training that has to include local people from the beginning in the
design period, building on existing infrastructures and meet local
requirements.
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LIMITATIONS
Lack of Specific Guidelines
Among the limitations is, however, that this framework requires
thinking. It is not applying ticks to pre-set check lists. Its generic
nature can be criticized for being non-specific. However, this
framework acknowledges that different disciplinary groups (engi-
neers, architects, etc.) have created innovative technical solu-
tions to discrete problems. This framework, however, has a more
comprehensive and integrative understanding of biosafety and
biosecurity; these concerns cannot be reduced and discussed on a
level of isolated technical solutions. For instance, having naturally
ventilated labs seem to be a good solution for an environment
that has only intermittent access to power and constant climate
conditions in laboratories, but a focus on individual technical
solutions, such as natural ventilated labs, does not offer solutions
for broader and more complex biosafety and biosecurity. These
complex concerns require a different angle.
Hypothetical Pilot Status of the Framework
This framework is a theoretical, pilot framework, and thus a
draft. It was generated through a thorough analytic and reflective
process involving key stakeholders. However, we believe that the
application of the framework and the solutions generatedwith it in
the future will add relevant feedback and probably amend and/or
refinements.
RECOMMENDATIONS
This draft framework will be further developed and contextual-
ized. Envisioned are three major steps:
(1) Meetings to populate the framework
 Technical meetings and implementation discussions with
technical experts (engineers, architects, scientists, etc.) to
populate the framework;
(2) Briefings to popularize the approach;
 Briefings and discussion with key policy-makers;
 Further support for countries to take this framework to
political fora, international organizations, and working
groups, such asWorldHealthAssembly (WHA), theGlobal
Health Security Agenda, and theGlobal Partnership to gain
universal acceptance and support for such an approach.
(3) In a next step, this further refined framework should promote
political buy-in and advocate for changes in the laboratory
capacity building policy and in funding schemes.
CONCLUSION
The common practice of exporting costly and complex biocon-
tainment facilities and standards is not sustainable. Concerns
about sustained biosafety and proliferation of capabilities that
could be misused require careful consideration. The proposed
alternative framework for a safer, more secure, and sustainable
laboratory capacity building can guide capacity building accord-
ing to local needs (local) with an emphasis on relationship and
trust-building (people) and continuous outcome and impactmea-
surement (make sense). This generic framework can and should
serve as a blueprint for international policy decision-making
on improving biosafety and biosecurity in laboratory capacity
building.
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